Nyaya Kusumanjali of Udayana arguments for the existence of God
Early Naiyanikas wrote very little about God or
the existence of a Supreme Being. However, the contemporary Buddhist community
in India had turned from agnostic to strictly atheistic; as a reaction, the
later Naiyanikas entered into disputes with the Buddhists and tried to prove
the existence of God through logic. They made this question a challenge to
their own existence. Udayana's Nyaya Kusumanjali challenges popular arguments
for the non-existence of God and gives nine proofs in return. Below are some
popular extracts.
Now, although with regard to that Being whom all men alike worship,
whichever of the (four well known) ends of mans they may desire:
thus the followers of the Upanisads worship it as the very knower,
the disciples of Kapila as the perfect first Wise,
those of Patanjali as Him who, untouched by pain, action, fruit or desert, having assumed a body in order to create, revealed the tradition of the Veda and is gracious to all living beings,
the Mahapasupatas as the Independent one, undefiled by vaidic [Vedic] or secular violations,
the Saivas as Siva,
the Vaisnavas as Purusottama,
the followers of the Puranas as the great Father (Brahma),
the Ceremonialists as the Soul of the sacrifice,
thc Saugatas as the Omniscient,
the Jainas as the Unobstructed,
the Mimamsakas as Him who is pointed out as to be worshipped,
the Carvakas as Him who is established by the conventions of the world,
the followers of the Nyaya as Him who is all that is said worthy of Him,
why farther detail whom even the artizans themselves worship as the great artizan Visvakarman?
Although, I say, with regard to that Being, the adorable Siva, whom all recognise throughout the world as universally acknowledged like castes, families, family invocations of Agni, schools, social customs, how can there arise any doubt? and what then is there to be ascertained?
1.3. Still this logical investigation may be well called the contemplation of God, and this is really worship when it follows the hearing of the sruti ([revealed scriptures]).
Therefore that adorable one who hath been often heard mentioned i.e.. the sruti, smrti (traditional texts), narrative poems, Puranas, itihasas etc must now be contemplated according to such a sruti as "He is to be heard and to be contemplated" and such a smrti as "by the Veda, inference and the delight of continued meditation, in this threefold manner producing knowledge, a man obtains the highest concentration."
Now there is, in short, a fivefold opposition to our theory, based, first, on the nonexistence of any supernatural cause of another world (as adarsta, the merit and demerit of our actions);' or secondly, on the possibility of our putting in action certain causes of another world (as sacrifices) even if God be allowed to be non existent; or thirdly, on the existence of proofs which show the non existence of God; or fourthly, on the opinion that, even if God does exist, he cannot be a cause of true knowledge to us; or fifthly, on the absence of any argument to prove his existence.
1.4 From dependence, from eternity, from diversity, fromuniversal practice, and from the apportionment to each individual self, mundane enjoyment implies a supernatural cause [i.e., "desert"].
Our proposition is that there exists a supernatural cause of another world, i.e., a cause beOnd the reach of the senses.
(a) First of all, then, to establish the class of causes in general, he says, "from dependence." Dependence means here that the effect is occasional. All effects must have a cause since they are occasional, like the gratification produced by food [otherwise, if they did not depend on a cause, they could be found anywhere and always],
(b) (Objection:) "But if the cause of a jar were eternal, would it not follow that the jar, would also be eternal, and therefore we must assume the jar's cause to be itself only occasional, and therefore the perpetual series of causes must be all occasional, each dependent on its previous cause?"
To meet this objection of a regressus ad infinitum, he says, "from the eternity [of the succession of cause and effect]"; like the continued series of seed and shoot, the meaning being that a regressus ad infinitum ceases to be a fault, if, like this one alleged in our illustration, it can be proved by the evidence of our senses.
(c) (Objection:) " But [if Ou require a cause], why not say [with the Vedintin] that Brahma ([Brahman]) alone is the cause, or [with the Sarhkhya] Nature in the form of various individual intellects?"
To meet this, he says, "from the diversity [of effects, as heaven, hell]" as the effects imply a diversity of causes, from their being diverse as effects.
(d) (Objection:) " But why not accept a visible cause as sacrifices, why have recourse to an invisible desert (adrsta) ?";
To meet this, he adds, "from the universal practice", i.e., from the fact that all men, desiring fruit in another world, do engage in sacrifices. It is only the conviction that they do produce heaven as their iruit, which makes men engage in sacrifices, and these [passing away when the action is over] cannot produce this fruit unless by means of some influence which continues to act after the rite is over, and hence is this invisible influence, called merit or demerit, established.
(e) (Objection:) "But why not say that this desert does not reside in the same subject as the enjoyment [i.e., the individual self], but produces the enjoyment by abiding in the thing enjoyed? He replies, "from the apportionment to each self." Since the enjoyment resides in each word severally, we should be unwarranted to attribute its production to a desert residing elsewhere.
The second objection was that there is no proof of God, since the means of attaining paradise can be practised independently of any such being. That is to say "sacrifices, which are the instruments of obtaining paradise, can be performed even without a God, since it is proved in the Veda that sacrifices arc a means of obtaining heaven, and the Veda possesses authority from its eternity and freedom from defects, and we can also gather its authority from its having been accepted by great saints [as Manu and others] and therefore Ou cannot establish the existence of God on the ground that he is the author of the Veda; or we may suppose that the Veda was made by sages like Kapila and others, who gained omniscience by their preeminence in concentrated devotion."
He replies:
(Introductory commentary, II.1.)
II. 1. Since right knowledge requires an external source, since creation and destruction take place, and since none other than He can be relied on, there is no other way open.
The right knowledge caused by testimony is one which is produced by a quality in the speaker, viz., his knowledge of the exact meaning of the words used; hence the existence of God is proved, as he must be the subject of such a quality in the case of the Veda.
[Objection:] "But may we not allow that such a quality as the knowledge of the exact meaning of the words used is required in the case of an effect which implies an agent; but in the case of the uncreated Veda it is its freedom from defects which produces its authoritativeness, and we can know its authoritativeness from its aving been accepted by great saints?"
He replies, "because creation and destruction take place." After a mundane destruction, when the former Veda is destroyed, how can the subsequent Veda possess authority, since there will then be no possibility of its having been accepted by great saints ? ...
(Objection:) "Well, then, let us say that at the beginning of a creation Kapila and others were its authors, who had acquired omniscience by the power of merit gained by the practice of concentrated devotion in the former aeon."
He replies, "none other than He can be relied on." If Ou mean by omniscient beings, those endowed with the various superhuman faculties of assuming infinitesimal size and capable of creating everything, then we reply that the law of parsimony bids us assume only one such, namely Him, the adorable Lord. There can be no confidence in a non-eternal and non omniscient being, and hence it follows that according to the system which rejects God, the tradition of the Veda is simultaneously overthrown, "there is no other way open."
The third objection was that there were positive arguments to prove God's non existcricc.
"Just as we infer a jar's absence in a given space of ground [i.e., its non existcnce there, so we infer God's non existence from His not being perceived. If you reply that 'the Supreme Being is not a legitimate object of perception, and, therefore, since we cannot here have a valid non perception, we cannot assume His non existence,' we retort that in the same way we might prove that a hare's horns may exist since we have only to maintain that it is not a legitimate object of our Perccption."
He answers:
(Introductory commentaryg III.l.)
III.l. In an illegitimate object [of perception] how can there be a valid non perception? and still more, how can Ou establish Our contradiction? How can the hare's horn be precluded as absurd if it is an illegitimate object? and how can Ou have an inference without a subject to base it on?
In the case of the Supreme Being who is not a legitimate object, how can there be a valid non perception? It is only this which precludes a thing's existence; but the absence of perception which obtains in the case of God cannot exert this precluding influence, as otherwise we should equally be forced to deny the existence of either merit, demerit. But a horn must be a legitimate object of perception, how then can our retort contradict our argument? If Ou say that a hare's horn is an illegitimate object of perception, then of course its existence is not necessarily precluded, there is only an absence of proof to establish it; but this cannot be retorted against us as the fifth Cluster will fully show that there are positive arguments to establish God's existence.
([Objection:]) "But may we not infer God's non existence from the absence, in His case, of a body, and also of any assignable motive for action? He replies, how can Ou have an inference where the minor term is itself controverted? while on the other hand the very proof which will establish the existence of the subjet (God) is itself sufficient to debar Our subsequent inference [that there is no God].
The fourth objection was that even if God did exist, he could not be a cause of right knowledge to us. "God cannot be an authority to us, because he has no right knowledge, as his knowledge lacks the indispensable characteristic of cognizing an object uncognized before; hence he neither possesses right knowledge himself nor can produce it in us, and who would trust the words of a . being who cannot be a cause of right knowledge?"
He replies, (Introductory commentary, IV.1.)
IV.1. Cognizing for the first time is no true mark, as it is both too narrow and too wide; we hold right knowledge to be an independent impression which corresponds to the reality.
Your "cognizing an object uncognized before" is not an indispensable characteristic mark of right knowledge, as it fails to apply in such an affirmative instance as repeated knowledge [i.e., seeing a thing a second or third time], and wrongly applies to such a negative instance as the erroneous judgment that "this [nacre before me] is silver.". . .
(Objection:) "May we not, however, still maintain that God's knowledge is not properly 'right knowledge' since it is not produced by proof; and therefore God can neither be a right knower Himself nor be a cause of right knowledge to us, since the essential conditions for both are absent in Him?" He replies,
(Introductory commentary, iv.5.)
IV.5. Right knowledge is accurate comprehension and right knowing is the possession thereof, authoritativeness is, according to Gautama's school ([Nyaya]), the being separated from all absence thereof.
Right knowledge is a notion corresponding to the object; and this is not inconsistent with God's knowledge, even though His knowing be not produced [but eternal]. "Right knowing"... means the being connected with right knowledge by intimate relation ... and this can be established of God, even though He be not a cause of right knowledge to us. In the same way God is an authority as being Himself ever connected with right knowledge, i.e., as being ever " separated from all absence thereof. " There is no need to include as absolutely necessary in Our definition that He must be an instrument of right knowledge to others, since God's authoritativeness is thus declared in the Nyaya Saitra (ii.i.68). "The fact of the Veda being an authority [i.e., an instrument of right knowledge], like the spells [against poison] and the medical science, follows from the authoritativeness of the fit person (who gave it)". . .
The fifth objection was "from the absence of positive proof".:
"May we not say that there are no proofs to establish God's existence?"
He replies, (Introductory commentary, V. 1.)
V.1. From effects, combination, support, &c., traditional arts, authoritativeness, hud (revealed scriptures), the sentences thereof, and particular numbers, an everlasting omniscient Being is to be established.
(a) The earth, must have had a maker because they have the nature of "effects" like a jar; by a thing's having a maker we mean that it is produced by some agent who possesses the wish to make, and has also a perceptive knowledge of the material cause out of which it is to be made.
(b) "Combination" is an action, and therefore the action which produced the conjunction of two atoms, initiating the binary compound, at the beginning of a creation, must have been accompanied by the volition of an intelligent being, because it has the nature of an action, like the actions of bodies such as ours.
(c) "Support": The world depends upon some being who possesses a volition which hinders it from falling, because it has the nature of being supported, like a stick supported by a bird in the air; by being supported we mean the absence of falling in the case of bodies possessing weight. By the {?} we include destruction. Thus the world can be destroyed by a being possessed of volition, because it is destructible, like cloth which is rent.
(d) "From traditional arts".. The traditional arts now current, as that of making cloth, must have been originated by an independent being, from the very fact that they are traditional usages like the tradition of modern modes of writing [invented by men independently, as systems of short hand, &c.).
(e) "From authoritativeness"; The knowledge produced by the Veda is produced by a virtue residing in its cause, because it is right knowledge, just as is the case in the right knowledge produced by perception
(f) From sruti, i.e., the Veda. The Veda must have been produced by a person from its having the nature of a Veda like the Ayur Veda [ ... treating of medical science].
(g) Again, the Veda must have been produced by a person because it has the nature of "sentences, like the Mahabhdarata; or, in other words, the sentences of the Veda were produced by a person because they have the nature of sentences, just as the sentences of beings like ourselves.
(h) "From particular numbers." The measure of a binary compound is produced by number since it is a derived [not eternal) measure and at the same time is not produced by measure or aggregation,. . . the measure of an atom does not produce measure because its measure is eternal (and therefore incapable of change] or because it is the measure of an atom. Hence at the beginning of a creation there must be the number of duality abiding in the atoms, which is the cause of the measure of the binary compound, but this number cannot be produced at that time by the distinguishing perception of beings like ourselves. Therefore we can only assume this distinguishing faculty as then existing in God. By the last words of the text it is meant that it is the Being, possessed of this attribute [of omniscience], who is everlasting, and hence is established his eternal omniscience.
(Objection:) "But how does the fact of a thing's being an effect necessitate that it should have been produced by volition?" He replies, (Introductory commentary, v.4.)
v.4. If it [the atom] acts independently, it ceases to be brute matter; if there be no cause there is no effect; a particular effect has a particular cause.
There cannot be an effect without a causer. If the atom were endued with volition it would follow that the atom was intelligent, since an unintelligent thing can produce an effect only when impelled by an intelligent being;...
v.6. Activity is really volition, and this springs from the desire to act, and this from knowledge, and the object of this knowledge is a command, or [as he would hold] it is rather that which causes a command to be inferred.
v.14. The primary meaning of the potential used imperatively, (i.e., the true meaning of a command) is the will of the speaker in the form of a command enjoining activity or ccssation therefrom, while we conclude by inference that it is the means to a desired end for the doer.
The will of a fit person, i.e., God, having for its object engagement in the performance of an act [i.e., as in command] or refraining therefrom [i.e., as in prohibition], is the primary meaning of the affix of the potential, and from these is to be inferred that it is the means to obtain a desired end, [and hence the existence of "command" proves the existence of a commander, God...].
thus the followers of the Upanisads worship it as the very knower,
the disciples of Kapila as the perfect first Wise,
those of Patanjali as Him who, untouched by pain, action, fruit or desert, having assumed a body in order to create, revealed the tradition of the Veda and is gracious to all living beings,
the Mahapasupatas as the Independent one, undefiled by vaidic [Vedic] or secular violations,
the Saivas as Siva,
the Vaisnavas as Purusottama,
the followers of the Puranas as the great Father (Brahma),
the Ceremonialists as the Soul of the sacrifice,
thc Saugatas as the Omniscient,
the Jainas as the Unobstructed,
the Mimamsakas as Him who is pointed out as to be worshipped,
the Carvakas as Him who is established by the conventions of the world,
the followers of the Nyaya as Him who is all that is said worthy of Him,
why farther detail whom even the artizans themselves worship as the great artizan Visvakarman?
Although, I say, with regard to that Being, the adorable Siva, whom all recognise throughout the world as universally acknowledged like castes, families, family invocations of Agni, schools, social customs, how can there arise any doubt? and what then is there to be ascertained?
1.3. Still this logical investigation may be well called the contemplation of God, and this is really worship when it follows the hearing of the sruti ([revealed scriptures]).
Therefore that adorable one who hath been often heard mentioned i.e.. the sruti, smrti (traditional texts), narrative poems, Puranas, itihasas etc must now be contemplated according to such a sruti as "He is to be heard and to be contemplated" and such a smrti as "by the Veda, inference and the delight of continued meditation, in this threefold manner producing knowledge, a man obtains the highest concentration."
Now there is, in short, a fivefold opposition to our theory, based, first, on the nonexistence of any supernatural cause of another world (as adarsta, the merit and demerit of our actions);' or secondly, on the possibility of our putting in action certain causes of another world (as sacrifices) even if God be allowed to be non existent; or thirdly, on the existence of proofs which show the non existence of God; or fourthly, on the opinion that, even if God does exist, he cannot be a cause of true knowledge to us; or fifthly, on the absence of any argument to prove his existence.
1.4 From dependence, from eternity, from diversity, fromuniversal practice, and from the apportionment to each individual self, mundane enjoyment implies a supernatural cause [i.e., "desert"].
Our proposition is that there exists a supernatural cause of another world, i.e., a cause beOnd the reach of the senses.
(a) First of all, then, to establish the class of causes in general, he says, "from dependence." Dependence means here that the effect is occasional. All effects must have a cause since they are occasional, like the gratification produced by food [otherwise, if they did not depend on a cause, they could be found anywhere and always],
(b) (Objection:) "But if the cause of a jar were eternal, would it not follow that the jar, would also be eternal, and therefore we must assume the jar's cause to be itself only occasional, and therefore the perpetual series of causes must be all occasional, each dependent on its previous cause?"
To meet this objection of a regressus ad infinitum, he says, "from the eternity [of the succession of cause and effect]"; like the continued series of seed and shoot, the meaning being that a regressus ad infinitum ceases to be a fault, if, like this one alleged in our illustration, it can be proved by the evidence of our senses.
(c) (Objection:) " But [if Ou require a cause], why not say [with the Vedintin] that Brahma ([Brahman]) alone is the cause, or [with the Sarhkhya] Nature in the form of various individual intellects?"
To meet this, he says, "from the diversity [of effects, as heaven, hell]" as the effects imply a diversity of causes, from their being diverse as effects.
(d) (Objection:) " But why not accept a visible cause as sacrifices, why have recourse to an invisible desert (adrsta) ?";
To meet this, he adds, "from the universal practice", i.e., from the fact that all men, desiring fruit in another world, do engage in sacrifices. It is only the conviction that they do produce heaven as their iruit, which makes men engage in sacrifices, and these [passing away when the action is over] cannot produce this fruit unless by means of some influence which continues to act after the rite is over, and hence is this invisible influence, called merit or demerit, established.
(e) (Objection:) "But why not say that this desert does not reside in the same subject as the enjoyment [i.e., the individual self], but produces the enjoyment by abiding in the thing enjoyed? He replies, "from the apportionment to each self." Since the enjoyment resides in each word severally, we should be unwarranted to attribute its production to a desert residing elsewhere.
The second objection was that there is no proof of God, since the means of attaining paradise can be practised independently of any such being. That is to say "sacrifices, which are the instruments of obtaining paradise, can be performed even without a God, since it is proved in the Veda that sacrifices arc a means of obtaining heaven, and the Veda possesses authority from its eternity and freedom from defects, and we can also gather its authority from its having been accepted by great saints [as Manu and others] and therefore Ou cannot establish the existence of God on the ground that he is the author of the Veda; or we may suppose that the Veda was made by sages like Kapila and others, who gained omniscience by their preeminence in concentrated devotion."
He replies:
(Introductory commentary, II.1.)
II. 1. Since right knowledge requires an external source, since creation and destruction take place, and since none other than He can be relied on, there is no other way open.
The right knowledge caused by testimony is one which is produced by a quality in the speaker, viz., his knowledge of the exact meaning of the words used; hence the existence of God is proved, as he must be the subject of such a quality in the case of the Veda.
[Objection:] "But may we not allow that such a quality as the knowledge of the exact meaning of the words used is required in the case of an effect which implies an agent; but in the case of the uncreated Veda it is its freedom from defects which produces its authoritativeness, and we can know its authoritativeness from its aving been accepted by great saints?"
He replies, "because creation and destruction take place." After a mundane destruction, when the former Veda is destroyed, how can the subsequent Veda possess authority, since there will then be no possibility of its having been accepted by great saints ? ...
(Objection:) "Well, then, let us say that at the beginning of a creation Kapila and others were its authors, who had acquired omniscience by the power of merit gained by the practice of concentrated devotion in the former aeon."
He replies, "none other than He can be relied on." If Ou mean by omniscient beings, those endowed with the various superhuman faculties of assuming infinitesimal size and capable of creating everything, then we reply that the law of parsimony bids us assume only one such, namely Him, the adorable Lord. There can be no confidence in a non-eternal and non omniscient being, and hence it follows that according to the system which rejects God, the tradition of the Veda is simultaneously overthrown, "there is no other way open."
The third objection was that there were positive arguments to prove God's non existcricc.
"Just as we infer a jar's absence in a given space of ground [i.e., its non existcnce there, so we infer God's non existence from His not being perceived. If you reply that 'the Supreme Being is not a legitimate object of perception, and, therefore, since we cannot here have a valid non perception, we cannot assume His non existence,' we retort that in the same way we might prove that a hare's horns may exist since we have only to maintain that it is not a legitimate object of our Perccption."
He answers:
(Introductory commentaryg III.l.)
III.l. In an illegitimate object [of perception] how can there be a valid non perception? and still more, how can Ou establish Our contradiction? How can the hare's horn be precluded as absurd if it is an illegitimate object? and how can Ou have an inference without a subject to base it on?
In the case of the Supreme Being who is not a legitimate object, how can there be a valid non perception? It is only this which precludes a thing's existence; but the absence of perception which obtains in the case of God cannot exert this precluding influence, as otherwise we should equally be forced to deny the existence of either merit, demerit. But a horn must be a legitimate object of perception, how then can our retort contradict our argument? If Ou say that a hare's horn is an illegitimate object of perception, then of course its existence is not necessarily precluded, there is only an absence of proof to establish it; but this cannot be retorted against us as the fifth Cluster will fully show that there are positive arguments to establish God's existence.
([Objection:]) "But may we not infer God's non existence from the absence, in His case, of a body, and also of any assignable motive for action? He replies, how can Ou have an inference where the minor term is itself controverted? while on the other hand the very proof which will establish the existence of the subjet (God) is itself sufficient to debar Our subsequent inference [that there is no God].
The fourth objection was that even if God did exist, he could not be a cause of right knowledge to us. "God cannot be an authority to us, because he has no right knowledge, as his knowledge lacks the indispensable characteristic of cognizing an object uncognized before; hence he neither possesses right knowledge himself nor can produce it in us, and who would trust the words of a . being who cannot be a cause of right knowledge?"
He replies, (Introductory commentary, IV.1.)
IV.1. Cognizing for the first time is no true mark, as it is both too narrow and too wide; we hold right knowledge to be an independent impression which corresponds to the reality.
Your "cognizing an object uncognized before" is not an indispensable characteristic mark of right knowledge, as it fails to apply in such an affirmative instance as repeated knowledge [i.e., seeing a thing a second or third time], and wrongly applies to such a negative instance as the erroneous judgment that "this [nacre before me] is silver.". . .
(Objection:) "May we not, however, still maintain that God's knowledge is not properly 'right knowledge' since it is not produced by proof; and therefore God can neither be a right knower Himself nor be a cause of right knowledge to us, since the essential conditions for both are absent in Him?" He replies,
(Introductory commentary, iv.5.)
IV.5. Right knowledge is accurate comprehension and right knowing is the possession thereof, authoritativeness is, according to Gautama's school ([Nyaya]), the being separated from all absence thereof.
Right knowledge is a notion corresponding to the object; and this is not inconsistent with God's knowledge, even though His knowing be not produced [but eternal]. "Right knowing"... means the being connected with right knowledge by intimate relation ... and this can be established of God, even though He be not a cause of right knowledge to us. In the same way God is an authority as being Himself ever connected with right knowledge, i.e., as being ever " separated from all absence thereof. " There is no need to include as absolutely necessary in Our definition that He must be an instrument of right knowledge to others, since God's authoritativeness is thus declared in the Nyaya Saitra (ii.i.68). "The fact of the Veda being an authority [i.e., an instrument of right knowledge], like the spells [against poison] and the medical science, follows from the authoritativeness of the fit person (who gave it)". . .
The fifth objection was "from the absence of positive proof".:
"May we not say that there are no proofs to establish God's existence?"
He replies, (Introductory commentary, V. 1.)
V.1. From effects, combination, support, &c., traditional arts, authoritativeness, hud (revealed scriptures), the sentences thereof, and particular numbers, an everlasting omniscient Being is to be established.
(a) The earth, must have had a maker because they have the nature of "effects" like a jar; by a thing's having a maker we mean that it is produced by some agent who possesses the wish to make, and has also a perceptive knowledge of the material cause out of which it is to be made.
(b) "Combination" is an action, and therefore the action which produced the conjunction of two atoms, initiating the binary compound, at the beginning of a creation, must have been accompanied by the volition of an intelligent being, because it has the nature of an action, like the actions of bodies such as ours.
(c) "Support": The world depends upon some being who possesses a volition which hinders it from falling, because it has the nature of being supported, like a stick supported by a bird in the air; by being supported we mean the absence of falling in the case of bodies possessing weight. By the {?} we include destruction. Thus the world can be destroyed by a being possessed of volition, because it is destructible, like cloth which is rent.
(d) "From traditional arts".. The traditional arts now current, as that of making cloth, must have been originated by an independent being, from the very fact that they are traditional usages like the tradition of modern modes of writing [invented by men independently, as systems of short hand, &c.).
(e) "From authoritativeness"; The knowledge produced by the Veda is produced by a virtue residing in its cause, because it is right knowledge, just as is the case in the right knowledge produced by perception
(f) From sruti, i.e., the Veda. The Veda must have been produced by a person from its having the nature of a Veda like the Ayur Veda [ ... treating of medical science].
(g) Again, the Veda must have been produced by a person because it has the nature of "sentences, like the Mahabhdarata; or, in other words, the sentences of the Veda were produced by a person because they have the nature of sentences, just as the sentences of beings like ourselves.
(h) "From particular numbers." The measure of a binary compound is produced by number since it is a derived [not eternal) measure and at the same time is not produced by measure or aggregation,. . . the measure of an atom does not produce measure because its measure is eternal (and therefore incapable of change] or because it is the measure of an atom. Hence at the beginning of a creation there must be the number of duality abiding in the atoms, which is the cause of the measure of the binary compound, but this number cannot be produced at that time by the distinguishing perception of beings like ourselves. Therefore we can only assume this distinguishing faculty as then existing in God. By the last words of the text it is meant that it is the Being, possessed of this attribute [of omniscience], who is everlasting, and hence is established his eternal omniscience.
(Objection:) "But how does the fact of a thing's being an effect necessitate that it should have been produced by volition?" He replies, (Introductory commentary, v.4.)
v.4. If it [the atom] acts independently, it ceases to be brute matter; if there be no cause there is no effect; a particular effect has a particular cause.
There cannot be an effect without a causer. If the atom were endued with volition it would follow that the atom was intelligent, since an unintelligent thing can produce an effect only when impelled by an intelligent being;...
v.6. Activity is really volition, and this springs from the desire to act, and this from knowledge, and the object of this knowledge is a command, or [as he would hold] it is rather that which causes a command to be inferred.
v.14. The primary meaning of the potential used imperatively, (i.e., the true meaning of a command) is the will of the speaker in the form of a command enjoining activity or ccssation therefrom, while we conclude by inference that it is the means to a desired end for the doer.
The will of a fit person, i.e., God, having for its object engagement in the performance of an act [i.e., as in command] or refraining therefrom [i.e., as in prohibition], is the primary meaning of the affix of the potential, and from these is to be inferred that it is the means to obtain a desired end, [and hence the existence of "command" proves the existence of a commander, God...].
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Book I - Chapter I
Statement of subject matter, purpose, and relation of the treatise
1. Supreme felicity is attained by the knowledge about the true nature of the sixteen categories, viz., means of right knowledge, object of right knowledge, doubt, purpose, familiar instance, established tenet, members [of a syllogism], confutation, ascertainment, discussion, wrangling, cavil, fallacy, quibble, futility, and occasion for rebuke.
2. Pain, birth, activity, faults [defects] and misapprehension [wrong notion] on the successive annihilation of these in the reverse order, there follows release.
From ... wrong notion proceeds attachment to the agreeable and aversion for the disagreeable: and under the influence of this attachment and aversion, there appear the defects, such as envy, jealousy, deceit, avarice and the like.
Urged by these defects, when the man acts, he commits ... misdeeds.. . .
What are meant by "activity" in this connection (in the sutra) are the results of activity,. . .
The "actvity" described above (in the form of merit and demerit) becomes the cause of mean and respectable birth (respectively);...
When there is birth, there is pain;.. .
When "true knowledge", is attained, "wrong notions" disappear; on the disappearance of "wrong notions" the 6 'defects" disappear; the disappearance of "defects" is followed by the disappearance of "activity" on activity " (rnerit and demerit); when there is no activity there is no "birth"; on the cessation of birth there is cessation of pain; cessation of pain is followed by final release, which is the "highest good".
Definition of the instruments of right cognition
3. Perception, inference, comparison and word (verbal testimony) these are the means of right knowledge.
Among the four kinds of cognition, perception is the most important;... when [a man] has once perceived the thing directly, his desires are at rest, and he does not seek for any other kind of knowledge; ...
4. Perception is that knowledge which arises from the contact of a sense with its object, and which is determinate [well defined], unnameable [not expressible in words], and non erratic [unerring].
... the name is not (necessarily present and) operative at the time that the apprehension of the thing takes place; it becomes operative (and useful) only at the time of its being spoken of, or communicated to other persons.. . .
"€¦ if the definition of sense perception consisted of only two terms - "that which is produced by the sense object contact" and "that which is not represented by words," then the apprehension of water [in the case of a mirage] ... would have to be regarded as "sense perception." ...That cognition is erroneous in which the thing is apprehended as what it is not; while, when a thing is perceived as what it is, the perception is not erroneous.
When the man observes from a distance, and sees (something rising from the earth), the cognition that he has is in the (doubtful) form " this is smoke, or this is dust"; inasmuch as this doubtful cognition is also produced by the contact of the sense organ with the object, it 'would have to be regarded as sense perception ' if this were defined simply as "that which is produced by the contact of the sense organ with the object." With a view to guard against this, the author has added the further qualification that the cognition should be well defined.
5. Inference is knowledge which is preceded by perception, and is of three kinds, viz., a priori, a posteriori and "commonly seen."
6. Comparison [analogy] is the knowledge of a thing, through its similarity to another thing previously well known.
7. Word (verbal testimony) is the instructive assertion of a reliable person.
Definition of the objects of right cognition
9. Soul (self), body, senses, objects of sense, intellect, mind, activity, fault, transmigration [rebirth], fruit, pain, and release are the objects of right knowledge.
10. Desire, aversion, volition, pleasure, pain, and intelligence are the marks of the soul.
11. Body is the site of gesture reactions], senses, and sentiments [objects].
"How is the body the vehicle of objects [or sentiments]?"
That is to be regarded as the vehicle of objects in which receptacle there appear the feelings of pleasure and pain caused by the contact of the sense organs with those objects; and such a receptacle is the body.
12. Nose, tongue, eye, skin, and ear are the senses produced from elements.
13. Earth, water, light, air, and ether these are the [material elements.
14. Smell, taste, colour, touch, and sound are objects of the senses and qualities of the earth, etc.
15. Intellect [buddhi], apprehension [upalabdhi], and knowledge [jnana] these are not different from one another.
It is not possible for cognition to belong to the unconscious instrument buddhi; as if it were, then buddhi could be a conscious entity; while there is a single conscious entity, apart from the aggregate of the body, and the sense organs. Though the sentence composing the sutra is for the purpose of providing the definition of one of the objects of cognition, yet it is taken as implying the other fact (the refutation of the Samkhya theory) by the force of the argument (implied in the mention of the synonyms). [According to the Samkhya philosophy, intellect '(buddhi), which is the first thing evolved out of primordial matter (prakrti), is altogether different from knowledge (jnana), which consists in the reflection of external objects on the self (purusa), the abode of transparent consciousness.]
16. The mark of the mind is that there do not arise (in the self) more acts of knowledge than one at a time.
... even though at one and the same time several perceptible objects... are in close proximity to the respective perceptive sense organs,. . yet there is no simultaneous cognition of them; and from this we infer that there is some other cause [namely, the mind], by whose proximity cognition appears.. If the proximity of sense organs to their objects, by themselves, independently of the contact of the mind, were the sole cause of cognitions, then it would be quite possible for several cognitions to appear simultaneously.
17. Activity is that which makes the voice, mind, and body begin their action.
[or]
Activity consists in the efforts or operation Of voice, mind, and body.
18. Faults have the characteristic of causing activity. [The faults are] attachment, aversion, and ignorance.
19. Transmigration means re births.
Having died, when [the self] is born again in an animate body, this being born again constitutes the rebirth of that [self] which is born"€¦The recurrence of this process of birth and death should be regarded as without beginning, and ending only with final release.
20. Fruit is the thing produced by activity and faults.
Fruition consists in the experiencing of pleasure and pain, as every action leads to pleasure and pain.
21. Pain has the characteristic of causing uneasiness.
... Every thing (i.e., body, etc., and also pleasure and pain), being intermingled with i.e., invariably accompanied by, never existing apart from pain, is inseparable from pain; and as such is regarded as pain itself. Finding everything to be intermingled with pain, when one wishes to get rid of pain, he finds that birth (or life) itself is nothing but pain; and thus becomes disgusted (with life) and being disgusted, he loses all attachment; and being free from attachment, he becomes released.
22. Release is the absolute deliverance from pain.
When there is a relinquishing of the birth that has been taken and the non resumption of anothcr this condition, which is without end (or limit) is known as "final release.". . This condition of immortality, free from fear, imperishable (unchanging), consisting in the attainment of bliss, is called "Brahman."
Definition of the pre requisites of a process of ratiocination or reasoning (nydya)
23. Doubt, which is a conflicting judgment about the precise character of an object, arises from the recognition of properties common to many objects, or of properties not common to any of the objects, from conflicting testimony, and from irregularity of percepton and non perception.
24. Purpose [or motive] is that with an eye to which one proceeds to act.
25. A familiar instance [or example] is the thing about which an ordinary man and an expert entertain the same opinion.
[The familiar instance aids in overthrowing contradicting opinions and in confirming one's opinions, and serves as "one of the essential factors of the inferential process."]
Definition of the tenet which is the basis of reasoning (nyaya)
26. An established tenet is a dogma resting on the authority of a certain school, hypothesis, or implication.
Definition of reasoning (nyaya)
32. The members (of a syllogism) are proposition, reason, example, application, and conclusion.
33. The proposition is the declaration of what is to be established.
[Example:] Sound is non eternal.
34. The reason is the means for establishing what is to be established through the homogeneous or affirmative character of the example.
[Example: Sound is non eternal] because sound has the character of being a product; as a matter of fact, everything that is a product is noneternal.
35. Likewise through heterogeneous or negative character.
For example, Sound is non eternal, because it has the character of being produced, [and] that which has not the character of being produced is always eternal, e.g., such substances as the self and the like.
36. A homogeneous [or affirmative] example is a fami liar instance which is known to possess the property to be established, and which implies that this property is invariably contained in the reason given.
... the form of the inference being: Sound is non eternal, because it has the character of being produced, just like such things as the dish. .
37. A heterogeneous [or negative] example is a familiar instance which is known to be devoid of the property to be established, and which implies that the absence of this property is invariably rejected in the reason given.
E.g., Sound is non eternal, because it has the character of being produced everything not having the character of being produced is eternal, for instance, the self....
38. The 're affirmation' is that which, on the strength of the instance, re asserts the subject as being 'so' [i.e., as possessing the character which has been found, in the instance, to be concomitant with what is to be established] or as being 'not so' [i.e., as not possessing the character which has been found in the instance to be concomitant with the negation of what is to be established. [Jha]
(a) When the instance cited is the homogeneous one, which is similar to the subject, e.g., when the dish is cited as the example. . . we have the re affirmation [application] stated in the form, sound is so i.e., sound is a product.
(b) When the instance cited is the heterogeneous one, which is dissimilar to the subject,--e.g., when the self is cited as an example... the re affirmation [application] is stated in the form, sound is not so.. . .
39. Conclusion is the re stating of the proposition, after the reason has been mentioned.
Definition of processes subsidiary to reasoning (nyaya)
40. Confutation, which is carried on for ascertaining the real character of a thing of which the character is not known, is reasoning which reveals the character by showing the absurdity of all contrary characters.
41. Ascertainment [demonstrated truth] is the removal of doubt, and the determination,of a question, by hearing two opposite sides.
1. Supreme felicity is attained by the knowledge about the true nature of the sixteen categories, viz., means of right knowledge, object of right knowledge, doubt, purpose, familiar instance, established tenet, members [of a syllogism], confutation, ascertainment, discussion, wrangling, cavil, fallacy, quibble, futility, and occasion for rebuke.
2. Pain, birth, activity, faults [defects] and misapprehension [wrong notion] on the successive annihilation of these in the reverse order, there follows release.
From ... wrong notion proceeds attachment to the agreeable and aversion for the disagreeable: and under the influence of this attachment and aversion, there appear the defects, such as envy, jealousy, deceit, avarice and the like.
Urged by these defects, when the man acts, he commits ... misdeeds.. . .
What are meant by "activity" in this connection (in the sutra) are the results of activity,. . .
The "actvity" described above (in the form of merit and demerit) becomes the cause of mean and respectable birth (respectively);...
When there is birth, there is pain;.. .
When "true knowledge", is attained, "wrong notions" disappear; on the disappearance of "wrong notions" the 6 'defects" disappear; the disappearance of "defects" is followed by the disappearance of "activity" on activity " (rnerit and demerit); when there is no activity there is no "birth"; on the cessation of birth there is cessation of pain; cessation of pain is followed by final release, which is the "highest good".
Definition of the instruments of right cognition
3. Perception, inference, comparison and word (verbal testimony) these are the means of right knowledge.
Among the four kinds of cognition, perception is the most important;... when [a man] has once perceived the thing directly, his desires are at rest, and he does not seek for any other kind of knowledge; ...
4. Perception is that knowledge which arises from the contact of a sense with its object, and which is determinate [well defined], unnameable [not expressible in words], and non erratic [unerring].
... the name is not (necessarily present and) operative at the time that the apprehension of the thing takes place; it becomes operative (and useful) only at the time of its being spoken of, or communicated to other persons.. . .
"€¦ if the definition of sense perception consisted of only two terms - "that which is produced by the sense object contact" and "that which is not represented by words," then the apprehension of water [in the case of a mirage] ... would have to be regarded as "sense perception." ...That cognition is erroneous in which the thing is apprehended as what it is not; while, when a thing is perceived as what it is, the perception is not erroneous.
When the man observes from a distance, and sees (something rising from the earth), the cognition that he has is in the (doubtful) form " this is smoke, or this is dust"; inasmuch as this doubtful cognition is also produced by the contact of the sense organ with the object, it 'would have to be regarded as sense perception ' if this were defined simply as "that which is produced by the contact of the sense organ with the object." With a view to guard against this, the author has added the further qualification that the cognition should be well defined.
5. Inference is knowledge which is preceded by perception, and is of three kinds, viz., a priori, a posteriori and "commonly seen."
6. Comparison [analogy] is the knowledge of a thing, through its similarity to another thing previously well known.
7. Word (verbal testimony) is the instructive assertion of a reliable person.
Definition of the objects of right cognition
9. Soul (self), body, senses, objects of sense, intellect, mind, activity, fault, transmigration [rebirth], fruit, pain, and release are the objects of right knowledge.
10. Desire, aversion, volition, pleasure, pain, and intelligence are the marks of the soul.
11. Body is the site of gesture reactions], senses, and sentiments [objects].
"How is the body the vehicle of objects [or sentiments]?"
That is to be regarded as the vehicle of objects in which receptacle there appear the feelings of pleasure and pain caused by the contact of the sense organs with those objects; and such a receptacle is the body.
12. Nose, tongue, eye, skin, and ear are the senses produced from elements.
13. Earth, water, light, air, and ether these are the [material elements.
14. Smell, taste, colour, touch, and sound are objects of the senses and qualities of the earth, etc.
15. Intellect [buddhi], apprehension [upalabdhi], and knowledge [jnana] these are not different from one another.
It is not possible for cognition to belong to the unconscious instrument buddhi; as if it were, then buddhi could be a conscious entity; while there is a single conscious entity, apart from the aggregate of the body, and the sense organs. Though the sentence composing the sutra is for the purpose of providing the definition of one of the objects of cognition, yet it is taken as implying the other fact (the refutation of the Samkhya theory) by the force of the argument (implied in the mention of the synonyms). [According to the Samkhya philosophy, intellect '(buddhi), which is the first thing evolved out of primordial matter (prakrti), is altogether different from knowledge (jnana), which consists in the reflection of external objects on the self (purusa), the abode of transparent consciousness.]
16. The mark of the mind is that there do not arise (in the self) more acts of knowledge than one at a time.
... even though at one and the same time several perceptible objects... are in close proximity to the respective perceptive sense organs,. . yet there is no simultaneous cognition of them; and from this we infer that there is some other cause [namely, the mind], by whose proximity cognition appears.. If the proximity of sense organs to their objects, by themselves, independently of the contact of the mind, were the sole cause of cognitions, then it would be quite possible for several cognitions to appear simultaneously.
17. Activity is that which makes the voice, mind, and body begin their action.
[or]
Activity consists in the efforts or operation Of voice, mind, and body.
18. Faults have the characteristic of causing activity. [The faults are] attachment, aversion, and ignorance.
19. Transmigration means re births.
Having died, when [the self] is born again in an animate body, this being born again constitutes the rebirth of that [self] which is born"€¦The recurrence of this process of birth and death should be regarded as without beginning, and ending only with final release.
20. Fruit is the thing produced by activity and faults.
Fruition consists in the experiencing of pleasure and pain, as every action leads to pleasure and pain.
21. Pain has the characteristic of causing uneasiness.
... Every thing (i.e., body, etc., and also pleasure and pain), being intermingled with i.e., invariably accompanied by, never existing apart from pain, is inseparable from pain; and as such is regarded as pain itself. Finding everything to be intermingled with pain, when one wishes to get rid of pain, he finds that birth (or life) itself is nothing but pain; and thus becomes disgusted (with life) and being disgusted, he loses all attachment; and being free from attachment, he becomes released.
22. Release is the absolute deliverance from pain.
When there is a relinquishing of the birth that has been taken and the non resumption of anothcr this condition, which is without end (or limit) is known as "final release.". . This condition of immortality, free from fear, imperishable (unchanging), consisting in the attainment of bliss, is called "Brahman."
Definition of the pre requisites of a process of ratiocination or reasoning (nydya)
23. Doubt, which is a conflicting judgment about the precise character of an object, arises from the recognition of properties common to many objects, or of properties not common to any of the objects, from conflicting testimony, and from irregularity of percepton and non perception.
24. Purpose [or motive] is that with an eye to which one proceeds to act.
25. A familiar instance [or example] is the thing about which an ordinary man and an expert entertain the same opinion.
[The familiar instance aids in overthrowing contradicting opinions and in confirming one's opinions, and serves as "one of the essential factors of the inferential process."]
Definition of the tenet which is the basis of reasoning (nyaya)
26. An established tenet is a dogma resting on the authority of a certain school, hypothesis, or implication.
Definition of reasoning (nyaya)
32. The members (of a syllogism) are proposition, reason, example, application, and conclusion.
33. The proposition is the declaration of what is to be established.
[Example:] Sound is non eternal.
34. The reason is the means for establishing what is to be established through the homogeneous or affirmative character of the example.
[Example: Sound is non eternal] because sound has the character of being a product; as a matter of fact, everything that is a product is noneternal.
35. Likewise through heterogeneous or negative character.
For example, Sound is non eternal, because it has the character of being produced, [and] that which has not the character of being produced is always eternal, e.g., such substances as the self and the like.
36. A homogeneous [or affirmative] example is a fami liar instance which is known to possess the property to be established, and which implies that this property is invariably contained in the reason given.
... the form of the inference being: Sound is non eternal, because it has the character of being produced, just like such things as the dish. .
37. A heterogeneous [or negative] example is a familiar instance which is known to be devoid of the property to be established, and which implies that the absence of this property is invariably rejected in the reason given.
E.g., Sound is non eternal, because it has the character of being produced everything not having the character of being produced is eternal, for instance, the self....
38. The 're affirmation' is that which, on the strength of the instance, re asserts the subject as being 'so' [i.e., as possessing the character which has been found, in the instance, to be concomitant with what is to be established] or as being 'not so' [i.e., as not possessing the character which has been found in the instance to be concomitant with the negation of what is to be established. [Jha]
(a) When the instance cited is the homogeneous one, which is similar to the subject, e.g., when the dish is cited as the example. . . we have the re affirmation [application] stated in the form, sound is so i.e., sound is a product.
(b) When the instance cited is the heterogeneous one, which is dissimilar to the subject,--e.g., when the self is cited as an example... the re affirmation [application] is stated in the form, sound is not so.. . .
39. Conclusion is the re stating of the proposition, after the reason has been mentioned.
Definition of processes subsidiary to reasoning (nyaya)
40. Confutation, which is carried on for ascertaining the real character of a thing of which the character is not known, is reasoning which reveals the character by showing the absurdity of all contrary characters.
41. Ascertainment [demonstrated truth] is the removal of doubt, and the determination,of a question, by hearing two opposite sides.
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Book I - Chapter II
Definition of controversy
1. Discussion consists in the putting forward (by two persons) of a conception and a counter conception, in which there is supporting and condemning by means of proofs and reasonings, neither of which is quite opposed to the main doctrine (or thesis), and both of which are carried on in full accordance with the method of reasoning through the five factors. [Jha]
2. Wrangling [disputation], which aims at gaining victory, is the defence or attack of a proposition in the manner aforesaid, by quibbles, fatilities, and other processes which deserve rebuke.
3. Cavil is a kind of wrangling, which consists in mere attacks on the opposite side.
Definition of fallacious marks of inference
4. Fallacies of a reason are the erratic [inconclusive], the contradictory, the equal to the question [neutral], the unproved, and the mistimed.
5. The erratic [inconclusive] is the reason which leads to more conclusions than one.
As for example, in the reasoning "Sound is eternal because it is intangible the jar which is tangible has been found to be non eternal, and sound is not tangible, therefore, being intangible, sound must be eternal," we find that the character of intangibility has been put forward as proving the character of eternality; while as a matter of fact the two characters do not bear to each other the relation of proof and proved....
6. The contradictory is the reason which opposes what is to be established.
7. Equal to the question [the" neutral reason"] is the reason which provokes the very question, for the solution of which it was employed.
That reasoning, in which what is put forward as the reason is the character that is admitted (by both parties) to be common (to that which is to be established and its reverse), is "equal to doubt" (in not leading to a certain conclusion); and such a reason, therefore, has been called 'indecisive';
8. The unproved is the reason which stands in need of proof, in the same way as the proposition does.
[As an example:] . . . "Shadow is a substance, " the proposition; to prove which is put forward the reason "because it has motion"; and this reason does not differ from the proposition, inasmuch as it is still to be proved; ...
9. The mistimed is the reason which is adduced when the time is passed in which it might hold good.
Definition of fraud or quibble
10. Quibble [casuistry] is the opposition offered to a proposition by the assumption of an alternative meaning.
11. It is of three kinds, viz., quibble in respect of a term, quibble in respect of a genus, and quibble in respect of a metaphor.
12. Quibble in respect of a term [verbal casuistry] consists in wilfully taking the term in a sense other than that intended by a speaker who has happened to use it ambiguously.
13. Generalising casuistry [quibble in respect to genus] consists in the urging of an absurd signification, which is rendered possible by the use of a too generic term. [Jha]
That word is called "too generic" which, while applying to the thing desired to be spoken of, also over reaches it; e.g., the brahminhood which is denoted by the term " brahmin " is, sometimes found to be concomitant with "learning and character" and sometimes it is found to over reach it, i.e., not concomitant with it.. . .
14. Quibble in respect of a metaphor consists in denying the proper meaning of a word by taking it literally, while it was used metaphorically, and vice versa.
Defects of reasoning due to the incapacity of the reasoner
18. Futility consists in offering objections founded on mere similarity or dissimilarity.
19. An occasion for rebuke [a clincher] arises when one misunderstands, or does not understand at all.
The man who misapprehends things becomes defeated; and "clincher" consists in this defeat.
1. Discussion consists in the putting forward (by two persons) of a conception and a counter conception, in which there is supporting and condemning by means of proofs and reasonings, neither of which is quite opposed to the main doctrine (or thesis), and both of which are carried on in full accordance with the method of reasoning through the five factors. [Jha]
2. Wrangling [disputation], which aims at gaining victory, is the defence or attack of a proposition in the manner aforesaid, by quibbles, fatilities, and other processes which deserve rebuke.
3. Cavil is a kind of wrangling, which consists in mere attacks on the opposite side.
Definition of fallacious marks of inference
4. Fallacies of a reason are the erratic [inconclusive], the contradictory, the equal to the question [neutral], the unproved, and the mistimed.
5. The erratic [inconclusive] is the reason which leads to more conclusions than one.
As for example, in the reasoning "Sound is eternal because it is intangible the jar which is tangible has been found to be non eternal, and sound is not tangible, therefore, being intangible, sound must be eternal," we find that the character of intangibility has been put forward as proving the character of eternality; while as a matter of fact the two characters do not bear to each other the relation of proof and proved....
6. The contradictory is the reason which opposes what is to be established.
7. Equal to the question [the" neutral reason"] is the reason which provokes the very question, for the solution of which it was employed.
That reasoning, in which what is put forward as the reason is the character that is admitted (by both parties) to be common (to that which is to be established and its reverse), is "equal to doubt" (in not leading to a certain conclusion); and such a reason, therefore, has been called 'indecisive';
8. The unproved is the reason which stands in need of proof, in the same way as the proposition does.
[As an example:] . . . "Shadow is a substance, " the proposition; to prove which is put forward the reason "because it has motion"; and this reason does not differ from the proposition, inasmuch as it is still to be proved; ...
9. The mistimed is the reason which is adduced when the time is passed in which it might hold good.
Definition of fraud or quibble
10. Quibble [casuistry] is the opposition offered to a proposition by the assumption of an alternative meaning.
11. It is of three kinds, viz., quibble in respect of a term, quibble in respect of a genus, and quibble in respect of a metaphor.
12. Quibble in respect of a term [verbal casuistry] consists in wilfully taking the term in a sense other than that intended by a speaker who has happened to use it ambiguously.
13. Generalising casuistry [quibble in respect to genus] consists in the urging of an absurd signification, which is rendered possible by the use of a too generic term. [Jha]
That word is called "too generic" which, while applying to the thing desired to be spoken of, also over reaches it; e.g., the brahminhood which is denoted by the term " brahmin " is, sometimes found to be concomitant with "learning and character" and sometimes it is found to over reach it, i.e., not concomitant with it.. . .
14. Quibble in respect of a metaphor consists in denying the proper meaning of a word by taking it literally, while it was used metaphorically, and vice versa.
Defects of reasoning due to the incapacity of the reasoner
18. Futility consists in offering objections founded on mere similarity or dissimilarity.
19. An occasion for rebuke [a clincher] arises when one misunderstands, or does not understand at all.
The man who misapprehends things becomes defeated; and "clincher" consists in this defeat.
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Book V - Chapter I
The futile rejoinders [fallacious opposition]
1. Futilities are as follows: (I) Balancing the homogeneity, (2) balancing the heterogeneity, (3) balancing an addition, (4) balancing a subtraction, (5) balancing the questionable, (6) balancing the unquestionable, (7) balancing the alternative, (8) balancing the reciprocity, (9) balancing the co presence, (10) balancing the mutual absence, (11) balancing the infinite regression, (12) balancing the counter example, (13) balancing the non produced, (14) balancing the doubt, (15) balancing the controversy, (16) balancing the nonreason, (17) balancing the presumption, (18) balancing the nondifference, (19) balancing the non demonstration, (20) balancing the perception, (21) balancing the non perception, (22) balancing the non eternality, (23) balancing the eternality and (24) balancing the effect.
.2. If against an argument based on a homogeneous or heterogeneous example one offers an opposition based on the same kind of example, the opposition will be called " balancing the homogeneity " or "balancing the heterogeneity."
3. The proposition would [should] be established in the same manner as the fact of a certain animal being the "cow" is established by the presence in it of the class character of the "cow." [Jha]
If the opposition...is to be valid it must be based on the example, homogeneous or heterogeneous, exhibiting a universal connection between the reason and the predicate such as we discern between a cow and cowhood or a universal disconnection between the reason and the absence of the predicate such as we discern between a cow and absence of cowhood. [S.B.H.]
4. Based upon the difference in the properties of the subject and of the example, there occur (futilities called) "balancing an addition," "balancing a subtraction," "balancing the questionable," "balancing the unquestionable," and "balancing the alternative"; and based upon the fact that [subject and example] both require proof, there occurs " balancing the reciprocity." [Revised translation Ed.]
If against an argument based on a certain character of the example one offers an opposition based on an additional character thereof, the opposition will be called "balancing an addition."
If against an argument based on a certain character of the example one offers an opposition based on another character wanting in it, the opposition will be called "balancing a subtraction."
If one opposes an argument by maintaining that the character of the example is as questionable as that of the subject, the opposition will be called "balancing the questionable."
If one opposes an argument by alleging that the character of the subject is as unquestionable as that of the example, the opposition will be called "balancing the unquestionable."
If one opposes an argument by attributing alternative character to the subject and the example, the opposition will be called "balancing the alternative."
If one opposes an argument by alleging reciprocity that is, that both subject and example equally require proof of the subject and the example, the opposition will be called "balancing the reciprocity." [S.B.H.]
5. This is [or: such arguments are], we say, no opposition because there is a difference between the subject and the example although the conclusion is drawn from a certain equality [similarity] of their characters.
7. If, against an argument based on the co presence of the reason and the predicate or on the mutual absence of them, one offers an opposition based on the same kind of co presence or mutual absence, the opposition will, on account of the reason being non distinguished from or being non conducive to the predicate, be called "balancing the co presence" or "balancing the mutual absence."
Is it by becoming united with the probandum (proposition) that the Probans (reason) would establish it? Or by not becoming united with it? It cannot establish it by becoming united with it; because by becoming united with it, it would become non differcnt from it, and as such could not establish it. When of two things both are existent, and become united, which could be the "probans " (reason), the "establisher," and which the "probandum" (proposition), the " established"? If, on the other hand, the probans (reason) does not become united with the probandum (proposition) then (on that very account) it could not establish it; ...
8. This is, we say, no opposition because we find the production of pots by means of clay as well as the oppression of persons by spells.
Neither of the above rejoinders is valid, because there are instances (1) where the cause (the potter) is present with the clay to produce the jar, and (2) where the cause (the exorcist) is absent from the effect (the person whom he kills by means of a spell administered from a distance).
9. If one opposes an argument on the ground of the example having been established by a series of reasons or on the ground of the existence of a mere counter example, the opposition will be called " balancing the infinite regression " or " balancing the counter-example."
10. The example does not, we say, require a series of reasons for its establishment just as a lamp does not require a series of lamps to be brought in for its illumination.
11. The example, we say, cannot be set aside as unreasonable only because a counter example is advanced as the reason.
[or]
If the counter example is an effective reason, the example also cannot but be an effective reason.[Jha]
12. If one opposes an argument on the ground that the property connoted by the reason is absent from the thing denoted by the subject while the subject is not yet produced, the opposition will be called "balancing the non produced."
13. [Answer:] Since it is only when it has been produced that the thing is what it is, and since what is urged as the ground (for the proposition) does then subsist in it, the presence of the ground cannot be denied. [Jha]
14. If one opposes an argument on the ground of a doubt arising from the homogeneity of the eternal and the non eternal because the example and its genus (or type) are equally objects of perception, the opposition will be called "balancing the doubt."
The opponent alleges that sound is homogeneous with a pot as well as pot ness inasmuch as both are objects of perception; but since the pot is non eternal and pot ness (the genus of pots or pot type) is eternal there arises a doubt as to whether the sound is non eternal or eternal. [S.B.H., with slight revision.]
15. This is, we say, no opposition because we do not admit that eternality can be established by the homogeneity with the genus: a doubt that arises from a knowledge of the homogeneity vanishes from that of the heterogeneity, and that which arises in both ways never ends.
Sound cannot be said to be eternal on the mere ground of its homogeneity with pot ness (the genus of pots or pot type) but must be pronounced to be non eternal on the ground of its heterogeneity from the same in respect of being a product. [S.B.H.]
16. By reason of similarity to both, there arises vacillation(opposition) based upon this reasoning is ["balancing the controversy"].[Jha]
By reason of the similarity (of sound) to both, eternal and non etemal things, there is likelihood of the two contrary views [i.e., the original proposition as well as its contrary]; this is what is meant by the term I'vaciflation."...
17. This is, we say, no opposition because it provokes a controversy which has an opposing side.
... The opposition called " balancing the controversy 19 cannot set aside the main argument because it leads to a controversy which supports one side quite as strongly as it is opposed by the other side. [S.B.H.]
18. "Balancing the non reason " is an opposition which is based on the reason being shown to be impossible at all the three times.
The reason or sign is impossible at all the three times because it cannot [as a significant reason for the predicate] precede, succeed, or be simultaneous with the predicate or significate. [S.B.H.]
19. There is, we say, no impossibility at the three times because the predicate or significate is established by the reason or sign.
... we find that the accomplishing of what is to be accomplished, as also the knowing of what is to be known, is brought about by a cause;... [similarly] the cause [i.e., the reason] is the means of accomplishing what is to be accomplished, and of the knowing of what is to be made known.
20. There is, we further say, no opposition of that which is to be
opposed, because the opposition itself is impossible at all the three times.
... [Similarly] the denial cannot exist, either before, or after, or together with, what is denied and since there can be no "denial" at all (of the reason urged by the first party), it follows that the reason (being undeniable) is firmly established.
21. If one advances an opposition on the basis of a presumption,
the opposition will be called "balancing the presumption."
[For examplej the opponent alleges that if sound is non eternal on account of its homogeneity with non eternal things (e.g., in respect of its being a product), it may be concluded by presumption that sound is eternal on account of its homogeneity with eternal things (e.g., in respect of its being incorporeal). [S.B.H.]
22. If things unsaid could come by presumption, there would, we say, arise a possibility of the opposition itself being hurt on account of the presumption being erratic and conducive to an unsaid condusion.
. . . If one says that " sound is non eternal because of its homogeneity with non eternal things," the presumption that naturally follows is that "sound is eternal because of its homogeneity with eternal things " and vice versa. There is no rule that presumption should be made in one case and not in the case opposed to it; and in the event of two mutually opposed presumptions no definite conclusion would follow. [S.B.H.]
23. "If the presence of a single (common) property were to make the two things non different, then all things would have to be regarded as non different, because the property of 'existence' is present in all "; this contention constitutes ["balancing the nondifferent"]. Uha]
The single (common property, in the case in question, is that of coming after effort; and because this single property is present in sound and in the jar, if these two things be regarded as non different, i.e., both be regarded as "non eternal "; then all things should have to be regarded as nondifferent.. . .
24. The above denial does not hold; because in the case of some (common property) the presence of certain (other properties) of the similar thing is possible, while in the case of others such presence is not possible. Uha]
25. ["Balancing the demonstration"] is based upon the presence of grounds for both (views). [Jha]
26. This denial has no force; because the presence of ground in support (of the original proposition) is admitted. Uha]
27. If an opposition is offered on the ground that we perceive the character of the subject even without the intervention of the reason, the opposition will be called "balancing the perception."
28. Inasmuch as the property in question may be due to some other cause, the denial has no force at all. Uha]
29. If against an argument proving the non existence of a thing by the non perception thereof, one offers an opposition aiming at proving the contrary by the non pcrception of the non perception, the opposition will be called "balancing the non perception."
30. The reasoning through non perception is not, we say, sound, because non perception is merely the negation of perception.
32. If by reason of "similarity" two things be regarded as having analogous properties, then all things should have to be regarded as "non eternal, " this contention constitutes ["balancing the noneternality"].
" When the first party says that 'Sound should be regarded as noneternal, by reason of its similarity to the jar, which is non eternal,' he becomes faced with the undesirable contingency of having to regard all things as non eternal, by reason of their similarity (consisting of existence) to the jar, which is non eternal."'
33. If rejection can be based upon "similarity," there should be rejection also of the denial (set up by the opponent), as there is a similarity between the denial and that which it is sought to deny.
... the said "denial" has this similarity to the original view that both are equipped with the factors of reasoning, proposition and the rest....
34. What serves as the reason is that property which is definitely known to subsist in the example, as being an infallible indicator of the proposition; and since such a reason can be of both kinds, there can be no non difference (among all things).
35. If one opposes an argument by attributing eternality to all non eternal things on the ground of these being eternally non eternal, the opposition will be called "balancing the eternal."
36. Inasmuch as the everlasting character of the " non eternality" in the subject of denial (sound) [is admitted by the opponent], the "non eternality" of the non eternal thing (sound) becomes established; so that there can be no basis for the denial.
37. If one opposes an argument by showing the diversity of the effect of efforts, the opposition will be called "balancing the effect."
. . . " Coming into existence after effort " we find in the case of the jar, etc., and we also find the "manifestation" of things concealed under some obstruction, by the removal of the obstruction [and this also is the outcome of effort]; and there is no special reason to show whether sound comes into existence after effort, or there is only manifestation of it (after effort); and the opposition set up on the basis of this fact of both these (production and manifestation) being equally the " products of effort," is [" balancing the effect"].
38. Effort did not give rise to the second kind of effect [e.g., manifestation], because there was no cause of non perception.
[or]
Effort cannot be regarded as the cause (of the manifestation of sound), as there is not present (in the case of sound) any cause of its non apprehension.
39. The same defect, we say, attaches to the opposition too.
... if an argument is to be set aside owing to an ambiguous meaning of the word "effect " why is not the opposition too set aside on the same ground ?...
40. The same may be said by the first party in answer to all (futile rejoinders).
In connection with all that may be taken as the basis of the futile rejoinders e.g., "similarity" and the rest whenever no special corroborative reason may be found the contention way be put forward (by the first party) that both views stand on the same footing.
41. Defect attaches to the opposition of the opposition just as it attaches to the opposition.
42. If one admits the defect of his opposition in consequence of his statement that an equal defect attaches to the opposition of the opposition, it will be called "admission of an opinion" [or: "confession of the contrary opinion"].
43. "Admission of an opinion" also occurs when the disputant, instead of employing reasons to rescue his side from the defect with which it has been charged, proceeds to admit the defect in consequence of his statement that the same defect belongs to his opponent's side as well.
1. Futilities are as follows: (I) Balancing the homogeneity, (2) balancing the heterogeneity, (3) balancing an addition, (4) balancing a subtraction, (5) balancing the questionable, (6) balancing the unquestionable, (7) balancing the alternative, (8) balancing the reciprocity, (9) balancing the co presence, (10) balancing the mutual absence, (11) balancing the infinite regression, (12) balancing the counter example, (13) balancing the non produced, (14) balancing the doubt, (15) balancing the controversy, (16) balancing the nonreason, (17) balancing the presumption, (18) balancing the nondifference, (19) balancing the non demonstration, (20) balancing the perception, (21) balancing the non perception, (22) balancing the non eternality, (23) balancing the eternality and (24) balancing the effect.
.2. If against an argument based on a homogeneous or heterogeneous example one offers an opposition based on the same kind of example, the opposition will be called " balancing the homogeneity " or "balancing the heterogeneity."
3. The proposition would [should] be established in the same manner as the fact of a certain animal being the "cow" is established by the presence in it of the class character of the "cow." [Jha]
If the opposition...is to be valid it must be based on the example, homogeneous or heterogeneous, exhibiting a universal connection between the reason and the predicate such as we discern between a cow and cowhood or a universal disconnection between the reason and the absence of the predicate such as we discern between a cow and absence of cowhood. [S.B.H.]
4. Based upon the difference in the properties of the subject and of the example, there occur (futilities called) "balancing an addition," "balancing a subtraction," "balancing the questionable," "balancing the unquestionable," and "balancing the alternative"; and based upon the fact that [subject and example] both require proof, there occurs " balancing the reciprocity." [Revised translation Ed.]
If against an argument based on a certain character of the example one offers an opposition based on an additional character thereof, the opposition will be called "balancing an addition."
If against an argument based on a certain character of the example one offers an opposition based on another character wanting in it, the opposition will be called "balancing a subtraction."
If one opposes an argument by maintaining that the character of the example is as questionable as that of the subject, the opposition will be called "balancing the questionable."
If one opposes an argument by alleging that the character of the subject is as unquestionable as that of the example, the opposition will be called "balancing the unquestionable."
If one opposes an argument by attributing alternative character to the subject and the example, the opposition will be called "balancing the alternative."
If one opposes an argument by alleging reciprocity that is, that both subject and example equally require proof of the subject and the example, the opposition will be called "balancing the reciprocity." [S.B.H.]
5. This is [or: such arguments are], we say, no opposition because there is a difference between the subject and the example although the conclusion is drawn from a certain equality [similarity] of their characters.
7. If, against an argument based on the co presence of the reason and the predicate or on the mutual absence of them, one offers an opposition based on the same kind of co presence or mutual absence, the opposition will, on account of the reason being non distinguished from or being non conducive to the predicate, be called "balancing the co presence" or "balancing the mutual absence."
Is it by becoming united with the probandum (proposition) that the Probans (reason) would establish it? Or by not becoming united with it? It cannot establish it by becoming united with it; because by becoming united with it, it would become non differcnt from it, and as such could not establish it. When of two things both are existent, and become united, which could be the "probans " (reason), the "establisher," and which the "probandum" (proposition), the " established"? If, on the other hand, the probans (reason) does not become united with the probandum (proposition) then (on that very account) it could not establish it; ...
8. This is, we say, no opposition because we find the production of pots by means of clay as well as the oppression of persons by spells.
Neither of the above rejoinders is valid, because there are instances (1) where the cause (the potter) is present with the clay to produce the jar, and (2) where the cause (the exorcist) is absent from the effect (the person whom he kills by means of a spell administered from a distance).
9. If one opposes an argument on the ground of the example having been established by a series of reasons or on the ground of the existence of a mere counter example, the opposition will be called " balancing the infinite regression " or " balancing the counter-example."
10. The example does not, we say, require a series of reasons for its establishment just as a lamp does not require a series of lamps to be brought in for its illumination.
11. The example, we say, cannot be set aside as unreasonable only because a counter example is advanced as the reason.
[or]
If the counter example is an effective reason, the example also cannot but be an effective reason.[Jha]
12. If one opposes an argument on the ground that the property connoted by the reason is absent from the thing denoted by the subject while the subject is not yet produced, the opposition will be called "balancing the non produced."
13. [Answer:] Since it is only when it has been produced that the thing is what it is, and since what is urged as the ground (for the proposition) does then subsist in it, the presence of the ground cannot be denied. [Jha]
14. If one opposes an argument on the ground of a doubt arising from the homogeneity of the eternal and the non eternal because the example and its genus (or type) are equally objects of perception, the opposition will be called "balancing the doubt."
The opponent alleges that sound is homogeneous with a pot as well as pot ness inasmuch as both are objects of perception; but since the pot is non eternal and pot ness (the genus of pots or pot type) is eternal there arises a doubt as to whether the sound is non eternal or eternal. [S.B.H., with slight revision.]
15. This is, we say, no opposition because we do not admit that eternality can be established by the homogeneity with the genus: a doubt that arises from a knowledge of the homogeneity vanishes from that of the heterogeneity, and that which arises in both ways never ends.
Sound cannot be said to be eternal on the mere ground of its homogeneity with pot ness (the genus of pots or pot type) but must be pronounced to be non eternal on the ground of its heterogeneity from the same in respect of being a product. [S.B.H.]
16. By reason of similarity to both, there arises vacillation(opposition) based upon this reasoning is ["balancing the controversy"].[Jha]
By reason of the similarity (of sound) to both, eternal and non etemal things, there is likelihood of the two contrary views [i.e., the original proposition as well as its contrary]; this is what is meant by the term I'vaciflation."...
17. This is, we say, no opposition because it provokes a controversy which has an opposing side.
... The opposition called " balancing the controversy 19 cannot set aside the main argument because it leads to a controversy which supports one side quite as strongly as it is opposed by the other side. [S.B.H.]
18. "Balancing the non reason " is an opposition which is based on the reason being shown to be impossible at all the three times.
The reason or sign is impossible at all the three times because it cannot [as a significant reason for the predicate] precede, succeed, or be simultaneous with the predicate or significate. [S.B.H.]
19. There is, we say, no impossibility at the three times because the predicate or significate is established by the reason or sign.
... we find that the accomplishing of what is to be accomplished, as also the knowing of what is to be known, is brought about by a cause;... [similarly] the cause [i.e., the reason] is the means of accomplishing what is to be accomplished, and of the knowing of what is to be made known.
20. There is, we further say, no opposition of that which is to be
opposed, because the opposition itself is impossible at all the three times.
... [Similarly] the denial cannot exist, either before, or after, or together with, what is denied and since there can be no "denial" at all (of the reason urged by the first party), it follows that the reason (being undeniable) is firmly established.
21. If one advances an opposition on the basis of a presumption,
the opposition will be called "balancing the presumption."
[For examplej the opponent alleges that if sound is non eternal on account of its homogeneity with non eternal things (e.g., in respect of its being a product), it may be concluded by presumption that sound is eternal on account of its homogeneity with eternal things (e.g., in respect of its being incorporeal). [S.B.H.]
22. If things unsaid could come by presumption, there would, we say, arise a possibility of the opposition itself being hurt on account of the presumption being erratic and conducive to an unsaid condusion.
. . . If one says that " sound is non eternal because of its homogeneity with non eternal things," the presumption that naturally follows is that "sound is eternal because of its homogeneity with eternal things " and vice versa. There is no rule that presumption should be made in one case and not in the case opposed to it; and in the event of two mutually opposed presumptions no definite conclusion would follow. [S.B.H.]
23. "If the presence of a single (common) property were to make the two things non different, then all things would have to be regarded as non different, because the property of 'existence' is present in all "; this contention constitutes ["balancing the nondifferent"]. Uha]
The single (common property, in the case in question, is that of coming after effort; and because this single property is present in sound and in the jar, if these two things be regarded as non different, i.e., both be regarded as "non eternal "; then all things should have to be regarded as nondifferent.. . .
24. The above denial does not hold; because in the case of some (common property) the presence of certain (other properties) of the similar thing is possible, while in the case of others such presence is not possible. Uha]
25. ["Balancing the demonstration"] is based upon the presence of grounds for both (views). [Jha]
26. This denial has no force; because the presence of ground in support (of the original proposition) is admitted. Uha]
27. If an opposition is offered on the ground that we perceive the character of the subject even without the intervention of the reason, the opposition will be called "balancing the perception."
28. Inasmuch as the property in question may be due to some other cause, the denial has no force at all. Uha]
29. If against an argument proving the non existence of a thing by the non perception thereof, one offers an opposition aiming at proving the contrary by the non pcrception of the non perception, the opposition will be called "balancing the non perception."
30. The reasoning through non perception is not, we say, sound, because non perception is merely the negation of perception.
32. If by reason of "similarity" two things be regarded as having analogous properties, then all things should have to be regarded as "non eternal, " this contention constitutes ["balancing the noneternality"].
" When the first party says that 'Sound should be regarded as noneternal, by reason of its similarity to the jar, which is non eternal,' he becomes faced with the undesirable contingency of having to regard all things as non eternal, by reason of their similarity (consisting of existence) to the jar, which is non eternal."'
33. If rejection can be based upon "similarity," there should be rejection also of the denial (set up by the opponent), as there is a similarity between the denial and that which it is sought to deny.
... the said "denial" has this similarity to the original view that both are equipped with the factors of reasoning, proposition and the rest....
34. What serves as the reason is that property which is definitely known to subsist in the example, as being an infallible indicator of the proposition; and since such a reason can be of both kinds, there can be no non difference (among all things).
35. If one opposes an argument by attributing eternality to all non eternal things on the ground of these being eternally non eternal, the opposition will be called "balancing the eternal."
36. Inasmuch as the everlasting character of the " non eternality" in the subject of denial (sound) [is admitted by the opponent], the "non eternality" of the non eternal thing (sound) becomes established; so that there can be no basis for the denial.
37. If one opposes an argument by showing the diversity of the effect of efforts, the opposition will be called "balancing the effect."
. . . " Coming into existence after effort " we find in the case of the jar, etc., and we also find the "manifestation" of things concealed under some obstruction, by the removal of the obstruction [and this also is the outcome of effort]; and there is no special reason to show whether sound comes into existence after effort, or there is only manifestation of it (after effort); and the opposition set up on the basis of this fact of both these (production and manifestation) being equally the " products of effort," is [" balancing the effect"].
38. Effort did not give rise to the second kind of effect [e.g., manifestation], because there was no cause of non perception.
[or]
Effort cannot be regarded as the cause (of the manifestation of sound), as there is not present (in the case of sound) any cause of its non apprehension.
39. The same defect, we say, attaches to the opposition too.
... if an argument is to be set aside owing to an ambiguous meaning of the word "effect " why is not the opposition too set aside on the same ground ?...
40. The same may be said by the first party in answer to all (futile rejoinders).
In connection with all that may be taken as the basis of the futile rejoinders e.g., "similarity" and the rest whenever no special corroborative reason may be found the contention way be put forward (by the first party) that both views stand on the same footing.
41. Defect attaches to the opposition of the opposition just as it attaches to the opposition.
42. If one admits the defect of his opposition in consequence of his statement that an equal defect attaches to the opposition of the opposition, it will be called "admission of an opinion" [or: "confession of the contrary opinion"].
43. "Admission of an opinion" also occurs when the disputant, instead of employing reasons to rescue his side from the defect with which it has been charged, proceeds to admit the defect in consequence of his statement that the same defect belongs to his opponent's side as well.
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created by mallikarjun — last modified 2005-07-11 06:41 AM
Book II - Chapter II
Examination of the fourfold division of the means of right knowledge
[pramanas]
1. Some say that the means of right knowledge are more than four, because rumour [tradition or hearsay], presumption, probability [deduction], and non existence [antithesis] are also valid.
2. This, we reply, is no contradiction, since rumour is included in verbal testimony, and presumption, probability, and non existence are included in inference.
3. Presumption, some say, is not valid, because it leads to uncertainty.
4. We reply: if there is any uncertainty, it is due to Our supposing that to be a presumption which is not really so.
Examination of the doctrine of the non eternaliy of sound or words [sabda]
13. Sound is not eternal, because it has a beginning [a cause] and is cognised by our sense and is spoken of as artificial.
14. Some will not accept this argument, because the non existence of a jar and the genus of it are eternal, and eternal things are also spoken of as if they were artificial.
[E.g., We speak of the part of a self, the part of space, etc., a thing having parts being non eternal, whereas self and space are admitted to be eternal.]
15. There is, we reply, no opposition because there is distinction between what is really eternal and what is partially eternal, [or: between the real (direct) and the figurative (indirect) denotation of the word "eternal"].
16. It is only the things cognised by our sense as belonging to a certain genus that must, we say, be inferred to be non eternal.
... what we mean is that the fact of sound being apprehended through sense contact leads to the inference that in every phenomenon of sound there is a series of sounds; and this fact ... proves that each of these sounds is non eternal.
18. Sound is non eternal, because neither do we per ceive it before pronunciation, nor do wc notice any veil [obstruction] which covers it.
Examination of the nature and potency of words
59. There is doubt as to what a word (noun) really means, as it invariably presents to us an individual, form and genus.
60. Some say that the word (noun) denotes individual, because it is only in respect of individuals that we can use "that," "collection," "giving," "taking," " number," "waxing," "waning," "colour," "compound " and " propagation."
61. A word (noun) does not denote an individual, because there is no fixation of [restriction to] the latter.
... what is denoted by the word "cow" is not the mere individual by itself, without any qualifications, and as apart from the universal (to which it belongs), but the individual as qualified by (and along with) the universal.. . .
62. Though a word does not literally bear a certain meaning [referring to an individual], it is used figuratively to convey the same, as in the case of brdhmin, scaffold [platform], mat, king, flour, sandalwood, Ganges, cart, food, and man, in consideration of association, place, design, function, measure, containing, vicinity, conjunction, sustenance, and supremacy.
What is meant by " one thing being spoken of as another which is not the same as that" is that a thing is spoken of by means of a word which is not directly expressive of it. For example, in the expression " feed the stick," the word "stick" is applied to the brahmin accompanied by (carrying) the stick, by reason of "association."
63. Some say that the word (noun) denotes form by which an entity is recognised.
64. "Inasmuch as the 'washing' etc. (laid down as to be done to the 'cow') cannot be done to the 'cow' of clay, even though it is endowed with individuality and configuration, it must be the universal (that is denoted by the word)." [Jhal
65. In reply, we say that it is not genus [universal] alone that is meant by a word (noun), because the manifestation of genus depends on the form and individuality.
66. The meaning of a word (noun) is, according to us, the genus, form and individual.
67. An individual is that which has a definite form and is the abode of particular qualities.
68. The form is that which [indicates or] is called the token of the genus.
69. The "universal" is the cause (or basis) of comprehensive cognition. [Jha]
1. Some say that the means of right knowledge are more than four, because rumour [tradition or hearsay], presumption, probability [deduction], and non existence [antithesis] are also valid.
2. This, we reply, is no contradiction, since rumour is included in verbal testimony, and presumption, probability, and non existence are included in inference.
3. Presumption, some say, is not valid, because it leads to uncertainty.
4. We reply: if there is any uncertainty, it is due to Our supposing that to be a presumption which is not really so.
Examination of the doctrine of the non eternaliy of sound or words [sabda]
13. Sound is not eternal, because it has a beginning [a cause] and is cognised by our sense and is spoken of as artificial.
14. Some will not accept this argument, because the non existence of a jar and the genus of it are eternal, and eternal things are also spoken of as if they were artificial.
[E.g., We speak of the part of a self, the part of space, etc., a thing having parts being non eternal, whereas self and space are admitted to be eternal.]
15. There is, we reply, no opposition because there is distinction between what is really eternal and what is partially eternal, [or: between the real (direct) and the figurative (indirect) denotation of the word "eternal"].
16. It is only the things cognised by our sense as belonging to a certain genus that must, we say, be inferred to be non eternal.
... what we mean is that the fact of sound being apprehended through sense contact leads to the inference that in every phenomenon of sound there is a series of sounds; and this fact ... proves that each of these sounds is non eternal.
18. Sound is non eternal, because neither do we per ceive it before pronunciation, nor do wc notice any veil [obstruction] which covers it.
Examination of the nature and potency of words
59. There is doubt as to what a word (noun) really means, as it invariably presents to us an individual, form and genus.
60. Some say that the word (noun) denotes individual, because it is only in respect of individuals that we can use "that," "collection," "giving," "taking," " number," "waxing," "waning," "colour," "compound " and " propagation."
61. A word (noun) does not denote an individual, because there is no fixation of [restriction to] the latter.
... what is denoted by the word "cow" is not the mere individual by itself, without any qualifications, and as apart from the universal (to which it belongs), but the individual as qualified by (and along with) the universal.. . .
62. Though a word does not literally bear a certain meaning [referring to an individual], it is used figuratively to convey the same, as in the case of brdhmin, scaffold [platform], mat, king, flour, sandalwood, Ganges, cart, food, and man, in consideration of association, place, design, function, measure, containing, vicinity, conjunction, sustenance, and supremacy.
What is meant by " one thing being spoken of as another which is not the same as that" is that a thing is spoken of by means of a word which is not directly expressive of it. For example, in the expression " feed the stick," the word "stick" is applied to the brahmin accompanied by (carrying) the stick, by reason of "association."
63. Some say that the word (noun) denotes form by which an entity is recognised.
64. "Inasmuch as the 'washing' etc. (laid down as to be done to the 'cow') cannot be done to the 'cow' of clay, even though it is endowed with individuality and configuration, it must be the universal (that is denoted by the word)." [Jhal
65. In reply, we say that it is not genus [universal] alone that is meant by a word (noun), because the manifestation of genus depends on the form and individuality.
66. The meaning of a word (noun) is, according to us, the genus, form and individual.
67. An individual is that which has a definite form and is the abode of particular qualities.
68. The form is that which [indicates or] is called the token of the genus.
69. The "universal" is the cause (or basis) of comprehensive cognition. [Jha]
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created by mallikarjun — last modified 2005-07-11 06:32 AM
Book V - Chapter II
Examination of clinchers and causes for rebuke
1. The occasions for rebuke are the following: (I) hurting the proposition, (2) shifting the proposition, (3) opposing the proposition, 4) renouncing the proposition, (5) shifting the reason, (6) shifting the topic, (7) the meaningless, (8) the unintelligible,, (9) the incoherent, (10) the inopportune, (11) saying too little, (12) saying too much, (13) repetition, (14) silence, (15) ignorance, (16) non ingenuity, (17) evasion, (18) admission of an opinion, (19) overlooking the censurable, (20) censuring the non censurable, (21) deviating from a tenet, and (22) the semblance of a reason.
2. "Hurting the proposition" occurs when one admits in one's own example the character of a counter example.
3. "Shifting the proposition" arises [when] upon the instance of one's proposition being opposed one defends it by importing a new character to one's example and counter example.
4. "Opposing the proposition" occurs when the proposition and its reason are opposed to each other.
5. A proposition being opposed, if one disclaims its import, it will be called "renouncing the proposition."
6. "Shifting the reason" occurs when, the reason of a general character being opposed, one attaches a special character to it.
7. " Shifting the topic" is an argument which, setting aside the real topic, introduces one which is irrelevant.
8. "The meaningless" is an argument which is based on a nonsensical combination of letters into a series.'
9. "The unintelligible" is an argument, which, although repeated three times, is understood neither by the audience nor by the opponent.
10. "The incoherent" is an argument which conveys no connected meaning on account of the words being strung together without any syntactical order.
11. "The inopportune" is an argument the parts of which are mentioned without any order of precedence.
12. If an argument lacks even one of its parts [or: is wanting in any one of the factors of reasoning], it is called "saying too little" [or: "the incomplete"].
13. " Saying too much the redundant "] is an argument which consists of more than one reason or [and/or] example.
14. "Repetition" is an argument in which (except in the case of reinculcationj the word or the meaning is said over again.
15. "Repetition" consists also in mentioning a thing by name although the thing has been indicated through presumption.
16. "Silence" is an occasion for rebuke which arises when the opponent makes no reply to a proposition although it has been repeated three times by the disputant within the knowledge of the audience.
17. "Ignorance" is the non understanding of a proposition.
18. "Non ingenuity" consists in one's inability to hit upon a reply.
19. "Evasion" arises if one stops an argument on the pretext of going away to attend another business.
20. If the party admits the flaw in his own thesis, and then urges the same in that of the opponent, this is a case Of ["the admission of an opinion"].
21. "Overlooking the censurable" consists in not rebuking a person who deserves rebuke.
22. " Censuring the non censurable " consists in rebuking a person who does not deserve rebuke.
23 A person who, after accepting a tenet, departs from it in the course of his disputation, is guilty of "deviating from a tenet."
24. "The fallacies of reason" already explained' do also furnish occasions for rebuke.
1. The occasions for rebuke are the following: (I) hurting the proposition, (2) shifting the proposition, (3) opposing the proposition, 4) renouncing the proposition, (5) shifting the reason, (6) shifting the topic, (7) the meaningless, (8) the unintelligible,, (9) the incoherent, (10) the inopportune, (11) saying too little, (12) saying too much, (13) repetition, (14) silence, (15) ignorance, (16) non ingenuity, (17) evasion, (18) admission of an opinion, (19) overlooking the censurable, (20) censuring the non censurable, (21) deviating from a tenet, and (22) the semblance of a reason.
2. "Hurting the proposition" occurs when one admits in one's own example the character of a counter example.
3. "Shifting the proposition" arises [when] upon the instance of one's proposition being opposed one defends it by importing a new character to one's example and counter example.
4. "Opposing the proposition" occurs when the proposition and its reason are opposed to each other.
5. A proposition being opposed, if one disclaims its import, it will be called "renouncing the proposition."
6. "Shifting the reason" occurs when, the reason of a general character being opposed, one attaches a special character to it.
7. " Shifting the topic" is an argument which, setting aside the real topic, introduces one which is irrelevant.
8. "The meaningless" is an argument which is based on a nonsensical combination of letters into a series.'
9. "The unintelligible" is an argument, which, although repeated three times, is understood neither by the audience nor by the opponent.
10. "The incoherent" is an argument which conveys no connected meaning on account of the words being strung together without any syntactical order.
11. "The inopportune" is an argument the parts of which are mentioned without any order of precedence.
12. If an argument lacks even one of its parts [or: is wanting in any one of the factors of reasoning], it is called "saying too little" [or: "the incomplete"].
13. " Saying too much the redundant "] is an argument which consists of more than one reason or [and/or] example.
14. "Repetition" is an argument in which (except in the case of reinculcationj the word or the meaning is said over again.
15. "Repetition" consists also in mentioning a thing by name although the thing has been indicated through presumption.
16. "Silence" is an occasion for rebuke which arises when the opponent makes no reply to a proposition although it has been repeated three times by the disputant within the knowledge of the audience.
17. "Ignorance" is the non understanding of a proposition.
18. "Non ingenuity" consists in one's inability to hit upon a reply.
19. "Evasion" arises if one stops an argument on the pretext of going away to attend another business.
20. If the party admits the flaw in his own thesis, and then urges the same in that of the opponent, this is a case Of ["the admission of an opinion"].
21. "Overlooking the censurable" consists in not rebuking a person who deserves rebuke.
22. " Censuring the non censurable " consists in rebuking a person who does not deserve rebuke.
23 A person who, after accepting a tenet, departs from it in the course of his disputation, is guilty of "deviating from a tenet."
24. "The fallacies of reason" already explained' do also furnish occasions for rebuke.
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